Wittgenstein and Levinas on the Transcendentality of Ethics by Appelqvist, Hanne & Pöykkö, Panu-Matti
1 
 
Authors’ manuscript. Final version published in Hanne Appelqvist (ed.) Wittgenstein and the 
Limits of Language, Routledge 2020, pp. 65–89. 
 
 
Wittgenstein and Levinas on the Transcendentality of Ethics 
 
Hanne Appelqvist & Panu-Matti Pöykkö 
 
“Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this 
that is mystical” (TLP 6.45). 
 
“The conditions for the world as a whole should 
not be confounded with the laws regulating things 




This article discusses Wittgenstein’s early ethics by comparing it with the ethical thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas. By treating ethics as transcendental, both Wittgenstein and Levinas are 
responding to the tension they find between contingent facts of the world and the absolute 
demand of ethics. We argue that the origin of this tension may be traced back to Kant’s 
philosophy, specifically to Kant’s division between nature and morality. Instead of grounding the 
ethical in the world of facts or in a transcendent realm over and above the limits of the world, 
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both Wittgenstein and Levinas resolve the tension by appealing to the idea of a perspective, 
distinct from the perspective of knowledge, that shows the world as meaningful or purposive in 
spite of its objective lack of meaning. By spelling out the relevant similarities and differences 
between Wittgenstein and Levinas, the paper addresses the nature and extent of the Kantianism 
in Wittgenstein’s early ethics. 
 
Keywords: early Wittgenstein, Levinas, Kant, ethics, aesthetics, reflecting judgment, world as a 
whole, the other, transcendental subject, sub specie aeternitatis, God. 
 
 
1. Introduction: The Gulf 
According to Kant, the domain of nature and the domain of freedom are separated from one 
another by an “incalculable gulf” (CPJ 5:176). Nature is determined by laws of nature and is the 
proper object of empirical knowledge. The domain of freedom, by contrast, is governed by the 
moral law, which is the a priori principle constitutive of pure practical reason, independent of 
the empirical domain. From the perspective of theoretical reason, nature remains a mere 
mechanistic aggregate of facts, where no empirical intuition corresponding to freedom, 
presupposed by morality, can be found. Hence, Kant claims, while we can think about freedom, 
we cannot have knowledge of it. This is because knowledge, in the strict sense of the First 
Critique, requires both concepts and empirical content. (CPR xxviii; CPR A545–547.) 
However, the human being is capable of thinking of herself not only as an empirical 
creature subject to natural laws, but also as the legislator of her own ends (G 4:412). These ends 
are answerable to the moral law, which the subject finds in her own practical reason as the 
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necessary condition of agency (G 4:429, CPrR 5:29).1 Moreover, the absolute demand of the 
moral law leads one to expect that nature itself may be hospitable to our moral ends even if 
nothing in nature as the object of knowledge suggests that this is possible. Accordingly, Kant’s 
goal is to build a bridge between the domains of nature and freedom. For Kant, this amounts to 
the task of showing that we have the right to judge the world to be purposive for our moral goals 
even if that judgment fails to meet the requirements of cognition (CPJ 5:176). 
This paper begins from the assumption that this Kantian picture of the place of the 
human being as an object of empirical knowledge and as the subject of moral agency is the 
immediate background of thought for both the early Wittgenstein and Levinas.2 Both assume that 
the world of facts is contingent, while the ethical demand is absolute – a position which 
immediately gives rise to the question of the grounds of that demand. Both respond to the 
question by stating that ethics is transcendental. Instead of grounding the absolute demand of 
morality on empirical facts, including psychological facts, they claim that ethics is a “condition 
of the world” (NB, 773; Levinas 1969, 204, 212). In this paper, we address the question of how 
this statement ought to be understood. We will argue that, just as the stage-setting of the 
problem, the solutions provided by Wittgenstein and Levinas respectively reflect the influence of 
Kant’s philosophy, yet go beyond the view Kant himself prefers.4 
  
2. Wittgenstein: the world as pictured and as felt 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein defines the world as the “totality of facts” (TLP 1.1). These facts 
are contingent, devoid of value, and independent of the subject’s will (TLP 6.41, 6.373). In these 
respects, Wittgenstein account of the world resembles Kant’s domain of nature taken as the 
object of empirical knowledge. However, while Kant grants that we can conceptually formulate 
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the moral law that is the a priori principle grounding the good will, Wittgenstein denies this 
possibility. According to him, “It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject 
of ethical attributes. And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.” (TLP 
6.423.) Moreover, given that no contingent fact as a possible content of a meaningful proposition 
has value, “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42). 
One of the paradoxical features of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is that, in spite of his 
denial of value-laden facts and ethical propositions, Wittgenstein does not abandon the 
distinction between good and bad willing. In the Notebooks, he mentions the good and bad will 
of the subject as one of his unquestionable starting points when addressing the question about the 
purpose of life (NB, 73; see TLP 6.43). While the picture theory of meaning entails the 
impossibility of meaningfully talking about the purpose of life, moral obligation, or the good 
will, the experience of one’s life as meaningful and of an absolute ethical demand are not 
illusions for Wittgenstein (see Moore 2013, 521–253). Like the inexpressible logical form, which 
is the necessary condition for the possibility of sense, ethics is strictly ineffable (TLP 2.18, 6.13, 
6.42). But for Wittgenstein, this ineffability just reflects the status of ethics as transcendental 
rather than empirical (TLP 6.421). 
What we are suggesting, then, is that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may be read as 
incorporating a radicalized version of Kant’s demarcation between the domains of nature and 
freedom. For Wittgenstein, the relevant contrast lies between the world of contingent facts on the 
one hand and the “sense” [Sinn] or “purpose” [Zweck] of that world on the other (TLP 1.1, 6.41; 




The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it 
is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists – and if it did exist, it 
would have no value. 
If there is any value that has value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what 
happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. (TLP 6.41.) 
 
Introducing the notions of value and sense of the world, these words also bear an echo of the 
opening lines of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein defines the world as “all that is the case”, 
determined by “the totality of facts” (TLP 1, 1.1). What is typically treated as the main import of 
the Tractatus, namely, the picture theory of language, treats the possibility of picturing such 
facts. According to this account, meaningful propositions are pictures of possible states of 
affairs, where true propositions correspond to existing states of affairs, namely, facts. Hence, 
every meaningful proposition has empirical content (TLP 2.12, 4.5).5 As argued by Erik Stenius 
and A. W. Moore, the Tractarian limits of meaningful language may in this respect be compared 
with the limits that Kant draws for cognition that presupposes sensible intuitions as well as 
concepts (Stenius 1960, 214–226; Moore 2013, 250–250 and Moore in this volume; CPR B75). 
Like Kant, Wittgenstein, takes the world of facts to be the object of empirical inquiry. 
According to him, “the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science” (TLP 4.11). 
Moreover, he claims, “the proper method of philosophy would really be the following: to say 
nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science” (TLP 6.53). As the sense of 
the world lies “outside the world”, it cannot be found among the accidental facts of the world, 
nor treated by philosophy insofar as we adopt what Wittgenstein claims to be its proper method 
(TLP 6.41). Yet, Wittgenstein adds paradoxically that natural science is “something that has 
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nothing to do with philosophy” (TLP 6.53; see TLP 4.111). And he famously claims that the 
propositions of the Tractatus ought to be recognized as nonsensical by anyone who understands 
him (TLP 6.54). Hence, if philosophy is understood in the broader sense suggested by these 
remarks and as employed by Wittgenstein himself, then the problem of the sense of the world, 
while nonsensical by the lights of the picture theory of meaning, assumes a different role in the 
context of Wittgenstein’s early thought. 
As suggested by TLP 6.54, the picture theory of meaning itself can hardly be taken to 
consist of statements of facts. Expressing the key idea of this theory, Wittgenstein writes, “What 
any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it 
– correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality” (TLP 2.18). 
But logical form is not a fact or a collection thereof: as indicated by TLP 2.18, it is a condition 
for picturing. Accordingly, it cannot be expressed in language: “Propositions cannot represent 
logical form: it is mirrored in them” (TLP 4.121). As we do not have access to a viewpoint 
outside of language or thought, logical form is known “from within”, as the form constitutive of 
the possibility of thought, manifest or displayed in it (TLP, 3; TLP 2.172). This view is 
expressed later in the book by the following words: “Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a 
mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental” (TLP 6.13). 
A point often left without explanation is that, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein uses the 
notion of transcendentality to characterize ethics as well as logic (TLP 4.121, 6.421). In his 1916 
Notebooks, Wittgenstein expresses the connection in a Kantian fashion, in terms of conditions. 
He writes: “Ethics does no treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like 
logic.” (NB, 77.) The Kantian interpretation of the Tractatus typically understands 
Wittgenstein’s statement of logic as a condition of the world as follows. Without the logical 
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forms of objects as the constituents of facts, the facts themselves would fail to have structure, 
which Wittgenstein takes to be essential for something to be a fact (TLP 2.03–2.033). The same 
holds for propositions and thoughts that are also facts (TLP 2.141, 3, 3.14–3.141). Finally, 
without logical form propositions would fail to picture facts, given that a shared form between 
the picture and the pictured is a necessary condition for picturing (TLP 2.18, 4.06). In fact, like 
Kant’s pure concepts of understanding that have an a priori relation with the objects of the 
phenomenal world, thought and reality are, in the Tractatus, claimed to have an a priori relation 
(TLP 3.02, 4.122, 5.4731; cf. CPR A80).6 But for Wittgenstein, thoughts always have the general 
form of “This is how things stand”; and how things stand is contingent and hence irrelevant for 
ethics (TLP 4.5, 6.41). How, then, should we understand Wittgenstein’s claim of ethics as 
transcendental? How could ethics condition the world of contingent facts so that the world 
appears as having sense? 
Restating the irrelevance of facts for ethics, Wittgenstein writes, “We feel that even 
when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain 
completely untouched” (TLP 6.52). In this remark, expressed by Wittgenstein by reference to a 
feeling, the problems of life indicate the sense of the world or – what Wittgenstein claims to be 
the same – the sense of life (NB, 73; TLP 5.621).7 In this context, the term “sense” does not 
indicate “what a picture represents” as it does in the case of pictures (including propositions), but 
is better understood as the meaning of life or the world seen as valuable (TLP 2.221). In the 
Notebooks, Wittgenstein uses the term “purpose” interchangeably with “sense”, opening the 
relevant discussion by asking “What do I know about God and the purpose of life?” (NB, 72).8 A 
little short of a month later he writes: “To believe in God means to understand the question about 
the sense of life” (NB, 74). Combining these remarks with the Tractatus’s point about the sense 
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of the world lying outside the world, one might draw the conclusion that Wittgenstein’s proposed 
answer to the problem of life is religious faith. That the case is less straightforward is shown by 
Wittgenstein’s further remarks, according to which God is simply another name for the sense of 
the world, that “to believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the 
matter”, and that “to believe in God means to see that life has a sense” (NB, 73–74). Rather than 
religious faith traditionally conceived, the import of these remarks is a repeated confirmation that 
the factual perspective on the world, substantiated by the picture theory of meaning, is not 
exclusive.     
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein connects the problem of life to ethics, aesthetics, and 
religion, i.e., those fields of traditional philosophy that in Kant’s account fall outside the bounds 
of theoretical philosophy. However, by contrast to Kant who only denies the possibility of 
cognition of freedom and eternity, Wittgenstein denies the very sensicality of propositions or 
thoughts about value (CPR A254–255, B xxv–xxix; TLP 4.023, 4.06; see Moore 2013). Instead, 
the term he typically uses in the context of value is “feeling” (see, e.g., TLP 6.43, 6.45; NB, 74, 
86; LE 7–8). The difference between Kant and Wittgenstein boils down to Wittgenstein’s 
rejection of any expressible a priori, manifest in his treatment of logic as well as ethics. While 
Kant’s position still allows the conceptual formulation of pure concepts of understanding that 
ground the possibility of empirical cognition, for Wittgenstein, logical form as the condition of 
sense is strictly ineffable and only shows itself (TLP 2.172, 4.121). The same ineffability applies 
to ethics: for Kant the moral law as the a priori principle of practical reason is expressible by the 
different formulations of the categorical imperative, whereas Wittgenstein states that “It is clear 
that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental.” (TLP 6.421.) And yet, he writes, 
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“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They 
are what is mystical.” (TLP 6.522.) 
The reason for Wittgenstein’s denial of ethical propositions is twofold. First, he limits 
the realm of meaningful language and thought to the picturing of contingent facts. Second, he 
holds that by contrast to contingent facts ethics is absolute. In accordance with Kant, who argues 
that the moral law must exhibit apodictic necessity, i.e., the kind of normative force that resides 
in the mere form of the principle independently of empirical considerations, Wittgenstein claims 
that ethics cannot be grounded on anything contingent (TLP 6.41). In his 1929 “Lecture on 
Ethics”, Wittgenstein states: “No state of affairs has, in itself, […] the coersive power of an 
absolute judge” (LE, 7). The suggestion clearly is that ethics ought to have such a power. 
Wittgenstein illustrates the point by comparing relative value statements, reducible to facts, to a 
road that will lead to an arbitrarily predetermined end. Should one reject the end, there would be 
no point in using the road. But an absolute value judgment ought to determine “the absolutely 
right road”, “the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or 
be ashamed for not going” (LE, 7). The road itself would, as it were, present its necessity with an 
absolute normative force that is self-evident.9 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: “When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt…’ 
is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I do not do it?’ It is clear, however, that ethics 
has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms.” (TLP 6.422). In 
the usual sense of the terms, rewards and punishments are factual events. Hence, explaining the 
normative force of the ethical demand by reference to them will fail to meet the absoluteness or 
“fundamentality” Wittgenstein attaches to ethics (see NB, 79). In 1929, Wittgenstein states that 
he can express his feeling of ethics only by a metaphor, namely, that “if a man could write a 
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book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy 
all the other books in the world” (LE, 7). It seems, then, that if there were ethical laws, these 
would have to exhibit the kind of necessity that Kant attributes to the categorical imperative. 
However, for Wittgenstein, no meaningful proposition is true a priori; and the only propositions 
that are necessarily true, namely tautologies, are true only in virtue of saying nothing about 
reality (TLP 2.225, 4.461, 6.375). This means that, by contrast to Kant whose categorical 
imperative is capable of determining which empirical actions are in conformity with the moral 
law, Wittgenstein’s insistence on the inexpressibility of ethics effectively blocks any connection 
between ethics and specific states of affairs. For Wittgenstein, “the only necessity that exists is 
logical necessity”, and that will not help us in uncovering the “coersive power” of ethics (TLP 
6.375; LE, 7).  
Nevertheless, we believe that Wittgenstein’s alignment of ethics with logic as 
“conditions of the world” ought to be taken seriously, as it points to the best available model for 
understanding transcendentality of ethics (NB, 79; TLP 6.13, 6.421). In our reading, the 
operative notion of transcendentality is Kantian in both cases, indicating the necessary conditions 
for the possibility of kinds of judgment and also, arguably, evoking a connection to the 
metaphysical subject as the seat of those conditions. To be sure, the source of logical form 
necessary for the possibility of picturing is subject to scholarly debate. Some take it to originate 
in reality, i.e., in the forms of objects, which Wittgenstein claims to be the unalterable substance 
of the world (TLP 2.021ff.; Hacker 1986, 23n; Pears 1987, 8; Glock 1997, 296). Others reject the 
very question as misguided, arguing that Wittgenstein’s goal is to disarm any attempt to justify 
the formal relation between thought and the world (Sullivan 1996). The Kantian interpretations 
of the Tractatus that draw their inspiration from Erik Stenius’s 1960 commentary typically lean 
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towards the idealist answer: the origin of logical form that guarantees the formal unity of thought 
and reality, is the metaphysical subject (TLP 5.63–5.633). It is not only that it would be difficult 
to explain logical necessity by reference to contingent facts of the world. The Kantian 
interpretation is further supported by Wittgenstein’s insistence on the impossibility of illogical 
thought, which is a natural outcome if the form of thought precedes the form of reality (TLP 
5.4731, 3.02; see Kannisto 1986, 148–153). 
Granted, Wittgenstein argues that, when understood in factual terms, there is no such 
unified entity that we could rightfully call a “subject”. The empirical subject is just an aggregate 
of facts and, Wittgenstein claims, “a composite soul would no longer be a soul” (TLP 5.5421). 
Whatever subject empirical investigation may uncover, it fails to do the philosophical work of 
making thoughts the subject’s own (TLP 5.542). However, like Kant who rejects the Cartesian 
conception of the self but proceeds by introducing the idea of a formal, transcendental subject, to 
whom the phenomenal world is given and who is somehow responsible for the unity of that 
world, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-
psychological way.  
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that “the world is my world”.  
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human 
soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the 




Wittgenstein’s identification of the metaphysical subject with the limit of the world means that 
the subject cannot be isolated by means of empirical investigation any more than logical form 
can. In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein describes the subject as a “presupposition” [Voraussetzung] 
of the existence of the world, thereby aligning the subject with the other two “conditions of the 
world”, ethics and logic (NB, 79). If read through the lens of Kant’s philosophy, the 
philosophical self is the vehicle of the world’s unity, displayed in the forms of thought and in the 
forms of facts – a view suggested by Wittgenstein’s claim about the world being “my world” as 
the origin of the very notion of a metaphysical subject (TLP 5.641; see CPR B131–136). 
Now, the only role for the metaphysical subject in its “theoretical capacity”, as we 
would like to call it, seems to be to “picture facts”. The metaphysical subject “shrinks to point 
without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it” (TLP 5.64). It thus looks as 
if the subject were nothing but a passive mirror of evaluatively neutral facts, inviting the 
interpretation of the metaphysical subject as equal with logical form (Kannisto 1986, 150). If this 
were the exclusive role of the metaphysical subject in Wittgenstein’s early view, then the 
inexpressibility or ethics would amount to denial of value. Voicing the concern in 1916, 
Wittgenstein writes, “can we conceive of a being that isn’t capable of Will at all, but only of Idea 
(of seeing for example)? In some sense this seems impossible. But if it were possible then there 
could also be a world without ethics.” (NB, 77.)10 
However, and again in accordance with Kant’s position, the metaphysical self does not 
encounter the world solely from the perspective of meaningful thought. The subject is also a 
willing subject, and this is what renders the world meaningful or purposive. Wittgenstein writes: 
“If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I, and 
which is the bearer of ethics. What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world.” (NB, 80.) 
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Hence, whatever the correct view on the source of logical form may be, Wittgenstein is quite 
explicit about the relation between the metaphysical subject and ethics: “Good and evil only 
enter through the subject. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world.” 
(NB, 79; see Moore 1987, 132.)  
But how are we to distinguish between the good and the evil, if the facts of the world 
are devoid of value and the denial of conceptually expressible ethical principles has blocked even 
the possibility of a conformity between the moral demand and certain empirical actions still 
available for Kant? Besides, if the willing subject is not a part of the world, then how can it 
interact with that world – a difficulty for Kant as well (see CPJ 5:176)? Wittgenstein, clearly 
aware of this problem, bites the bullet. He writes: “The world is independent of my will” (TLP 
6.373). And continues: “Even if all we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour 
granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connexion between the will and the world, 
which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something 
that we could will” (TLP 6.374). 
 Interestingly, Wittgenstein’s initial response to the question of the subject’s interaction 
with the world evokes the notion of the limit of the world. While the will is impotent with 
respect to facts, Wittgenstein claims that there is a difference in the world corresponding to the 
good or evil will, manifest in a shift in the limits of the world and experienced as happiness or 
unhappiness: 
 
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the 
limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language.  
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In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, 
so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.  
The world of the happy man is different from that of the unhappy man. (TLP 
6.43.)   
 
This remark should not be understood as claiming that ethics is a matter of feeling happy in the 
empirical sense of the term. Psychological states are, for Wittgenstein, as insignificant for ethics 
as any other facts (LE, 6). The happiness Wittgenstein talks about is rather a state of “agreement” 
or “harmony” between the transcendental will and the world: “In order to live happily I must be 
in agreement with the world. And that is what ‘being happy’ means” (NB, 75; see NB 78). The 
agreement between the will and the world is brought about by the subject’s attitude to that world 
and manifests in a change in the limits of the world (NB, 78).11 But the question remains, if the 
grounds for the harmony between the will and the world cannot be found in the world nor 
expressed conceptually, then whence does the absolute demand of morality derive its force? 
While his rejection of conceptually expressible ethical principles distances his position 
from Kant’s moral philosophy, in our view Wittgenstein’s way of treating ethics as absolute and 
transcendental still draws on Kant’s core idea of locating the foundation of ethics in an a priori 
principle. In Kant’s account, the goodness of the will means that the will, i.e., pure practical 
reason, is determined solely by its own a priori principle revealed by transcendental reflection of 
the necessary condition for the possibility of practical deliberation. Our proposal is that, in 
accordance with this strategy, Wittgenstein treats ethics as transcendental – and as such on a par 
with logic – but as grounding a perspective on the world that is distinct from the perspective 
grounded by logic. However, while logical form is given to us as the a priori form of our 
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thought, the perspective of ethics is grounded in an a priori form of feeling. The perspective of 
ethics shows the world as a happy world by bringing the will into a harmony with the otherwise 
evaluatively neutral facts; it shows the world as having sense or purpose that arises from the a 
priori form of willing itself.  
  
3. Levinas: The Other as an Object and as an Absolute 
The Kantian tension between contingent facts and the absolute ethical demand, which in our 
reading motivates Wittgenstein’s early ethics, is similarly at work in Emmanuel Levinas’s 
philosophy. Levinas joins Wittgenstein in thinking that life acquires sense or value only against 
the ethical demand. In Autrement qu’ètre ou au-delà de l’essence, Levinas writes: 
“Responsibility is what first enables one to catch sight of and conceive of value” (Levinas 1991, 
128). By “value” or “the ethical”, Levinas does not refer to moral, aesthetic, religious, and other 
evaluative judgments, which he takes to depend on their historical and cultural contexts. By 
contrast, the ethical is that which gives meaning to our engagement with the world and grounds 
specific evaluative judgments. 
In striking parallel with Wittgenstein’s way of connecting ethics with the sense of life 
and expressing that connection by reference to God (NB, 72–74), Levinas writes:  
 
Sense is the very fact that being is oriented, that there is Action or Life. Sense is the 
sense of life. To have sense is to be related to that which gives sense to life. What gives 
sense to life is above life. To be above life is what makes the whole of life oriented 
towards the other [lui]. To be oriented = to act and to reach [agir et aboutir] (it is not a 
game). To be completely oriented is to act without seeking simultaneity with the act’s 
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success (seeking simultaneity with the act’s success is not to be oriented). That towards 
which being is absolutely oriented = the Infinite […]. But God is unrevealed – in order 
for the renunciation of recompense not to be compromised. Sense demands 
simultaneously that action’s success is guaranteed but that all recompense – all 
simultaneity – is denied. Hence it demands a God that is not revealed or is revealed in 
ingratitude: the face of the Other [Autrui]. (Levinas 2009, 3, translation by Pöykkö.)   
   
This passage plays with the double meaning of the French word sens which, like the German 
Sinn, means both sense and direction or orientation. Ethics gives sense to life, but also orients me 
towards the other who commands me to acknowledge her uniqueness and vulnerability, to 
respond for and to her. At the outset, Levinas’s emphasis on the other marks a grave difference 
between him and Wittgenstein. This is because, for Wittgenstein, the fundamentality of ethics 
entails that ethics is possible even if “there is no living being but myself” (NB, 79). However, 
while treating the other as the source of absolute value, originally enacted by the relation to the 
other, ethics would obligate me absolutely even if I did not interact with others (Levinas 1998a, 
53).  
The quoted passage highlights another fundamental feature of Levinas’s ethics, namely, 
that the ethical obligation is absolute and without recompense. Ethics is neither measured by its 
results, nor grounded in any end. If ethics were thus grounded, then my responsibility would be 
“in calculations of deficits and compensations, in cost accounting. It would be subordinated to 
thought” (Levinas 2003a, 27). Here, “thought” indicates aboutness, i.e., an intentional relation to 
objects, states of affairs [Sachverhalt], or empirical facts as objects of knowledge that are always 
mediated by language as the “Said” (See Levinas 1969, 69, 210; Levinas 1991, 47).12 As such, 
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“thought” evokes a call for explanation and rational justification. But for Levinas, ethics is more 
fundamental than rational justification. While the other person is, in one sense, a contingent 
object of thought, my ethical orientation towards her treats her as absolute. The ethical relation 
between the subject and the other conditions the possibility of sense and value, and by doing so 
gives the other a transcendental rather than empirical status. In our reading, Levinas’s term 
“face” [visage] points to the other in the latter, transcendental capacity. (Levinas 1969, 202; 
Levinas 1998a, 111–112; Levinas 2000, 185–189.) 
As indicated by his criticism of the Hegelian historicist view, Levinas contrasts the 
ethical demand with natural and historical facts. According to Levinas, Hegel takes the value of 
the other to be determined by the position she occupies in a systematic conceptual whole to 
which she belongs, namely, the historical unfolding of the Spirit. Levinas writes: “Philosophers 
have ended up worrying about the meaning of history in a way a shipping company worries 
about weather forecasts. Thought no longer dares take flight unless it can fly straight to the 
haven of victory.” (Levinas 1990, 226.) By contrast to Hegel, Levinas takes history to be value-
neutral and incapable of providing a standard of valuation: “nothing, no event in history can 
judge a conscience” (ibid., 23). Valuation presupposes a distinction and “discord between events 
and the good”, unavailable for the Hegelian view (Levinas 1969, 246; see Batnitzky 2006, 78). 
Moreover, by collapsing the distinction between historical events and value, the Hegelian view 
promises a (theodical) victory, whereas for Levinas the ethical life cannot be based on promises. 
For just like Wittgenstein, Levinas assumes that the ethical obligates the subject unconditionally, 
without a promise or hope of a reward. 
For Levinas, the standard of valuation is the ethical obligation itself (Levinas 2003a, 
29–38). And the only available seat for this standard “is a free being who judges history instead 
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of being judged by it.” (Levinas 1997, 227; see Levinas 1969, 240–247.) This is to say that the 
obligation is always presented to the individual subject, to me that is. In accordance with Kant 
and Wittgenstein, Levinas rejects the Cartesian conception of a substantial subject: “There is 
nothing that is named I. The I is said by him that speaks.” (Levinas 1991, 56.) Yet, Levinas 
argues that the subject is individuated by the unnegotiable and unshareable ethical responsibility. 
The relevant I is not an object, but that unique ethical subject on whose shoulders the entire 
moral weight of the world rests: “The self is a sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, 
responsible for everything.” (Levinas 1991, 116; see ibid., 112, 114; Morgan 2007, 155–160, 
219–227; Drabinski 2001, 167–219; Salanskis 2015, 21–27.) 
Levinas’s account of the subject as individuated by responsibility and as free to judge 
history resonates with Wittgenstein’s words: “What has history to do with me, mine is the first 
and only world. […] I have to judge the world, to measure things.” (NB, 82.) While 
Wittgenstein’s concern is not related to Hegelianism, the core idea for both Levinas and 
Wittgenstein is that ethics forces the subject to take a personal stance on the world or on the 
other as that which is presented to the subject as an ethical challenge. For Levinas, the person 
who responds to the absolute ethical demand is liberated from her contingent surroundings and is 
able to see herself as unique (Levinas 1991, 121–129). Similarly, Wittgenstein connects ethics 
with the unique position of the subject: “Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my 
life arises religion – science – and art” (NB, 79). 
For Wittgenstein, psychological states are irrelevant for ethics because they are facts 
and as such contingent. Similarly, Levinas rejects moral sentimentalism because empirical states 
can never meet the absoluteness of the ethical demand: “my substitution to the other is the trope 
of a sense that does not belong to the empirical order of psychological events, an Einfühlung or a 
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compassion which, by virtue of this sense, signify.” (Levinas 1991, 125, translation modified.) 
As noted by Chalier, Levinas’s reasons for criticizing the sentimentalist tradition are Kantian: 
both Kant and Levinas “are reluctant to trust efforts to defend man’s spontaneous compassion or 
sympathy. Nothing is less sure, they say, and no ethics can rely on the partiality of individual 
impulses, even generous ones, without running the risk of injustice.” (Chalier 2002, 25; cf. CPrR 
5:118) While pragmatically useful in relating to others, compassion and love cannot ground 
moral obligation given their partiality and contingency. This point underscores the nature of the 
ethical relation: my relation to the other is not founded on empirical sentiments or interactions 
but on a more fundamental responsibility that alone can give those facts their value.  
While Levinas does not approach the distinction between facts and value in explicitly 
Kantian terms, his position is clearly indebted to Kant. By reference to the distinction between 
being and the ethical, between ontology and ethics, Levinas writes: 
 
We shall retain from Kantianism a sense that is not dictated by a relationship with 
being. It is not accidental that this reference comes from morality, which to be sure, is 
said to be rational on account of universality of the maxim. It is not accidental that this 
way of thinking about meaning beyond being is the corollary of an ethics. (Levinas 
2000, 65, translation modified; see also ibid., 57–77 and Levinas 1991, 129.) 
 
This remark expresses Levinas’s commitment to the transcendentality of ethics in the previously 
discussed Kantian sense of treating the necessary condition for the sense of life.13 Ethics is 
transcendental, “provided that ‘transcendental’ signifies a certain priority: except that ethics is 
before ontology […] It is a transcendentalism that begins with ethics” (Levinas 1998b, 90).14 
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Given that ethics precedes ontology, no inquiry into the nature of things will give us an account 
of the ethical obligation (Levinas 1969, 42–48; see also Levinas 1985, 96–97; Levinas 1991, 99–
109; Levinas 1998a, 152–171; Levinas 2000, 181–182; Fagenblatt 2004, 14–20). Echoing the 
Kantian reflective turn from facts to their possibility, Levinas states: “My task does not consist in 
constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning” (Levinas 1985, 90). 
Finally, for Levinas, the transcendentality of ethics means that ethics is “ineffable” or 
“unsayable”; it escapes the Said (cf. Levinas 1991, 7, 44).15 If we try to “say” the ethical, we will 
only end up providing reasons for the ethical obligation; and doing that will inevitably distort the 
nature of the ethical as a non-conditioned condition for the sense of life. To ask for the grounds 
of my obligation is to already step out of the ethical relation. Instead of being grounded in 
reason, reason itself is grounded in the ethical: the subject’s relation to the world is primarily 
ethical, where the ethical conditions also theoretical knowledge. Hence, even though he endorses 
the Kantian view of the primacy of practical philosophy, Levinas rejects Kant’s attempt to 
provide a rational foundation for morality. According to him, by providing theoretical reasons 
for the obligation, Kant ends up “saying the unsayable”. Interestingly, however, Levinas 
acknowledges that expressing “the unsayable” may turn out to be necessary in philosophy, even 
if this is always a “betrayal of the unsayable” (Levinas 1991, 162). – A betrayal not unlike that 
we find in the Tractatus that fails to comply with the method of saying “nothing except what can 
be said” (TLP 6.53).  
 
4. Wittgenstein: seeing the world from the right perspective  
Wittgenstein’s statements about the independence of the world of the will, the location of value 
in the willing subject not part of the world, and the contingency and resulting lack of value of 
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facts leave slim resources to make sense of the will’s ethical relation to the world. In the 
Notebooks, Wittgenstein struggles with the apparent gulf between the will and the world: 
 
Is it possible to will good, to will evil, and not to will? 
Or is only he happy who does not will? 
“To love one’s neighbor” would mean to will! 
But can one want and yet not be unhappy if the want does not attain fulfilment? (And 
this possibility always exists.) 
Is it, according to common conceptions, good to want nothing for one’s neighbor, 
neither good nor evil? 
And yet in a certain sense it seems that not wanting is the only good. […] 
Here everything seems to turn, so to speak, on how one wants. 
It seems one can’t say anything more than: Live happily! (NB, 77–78.) 
 
As the passage shows, rather than explaining the good will by establishing a connection between 
the will and the world by reference to an expressible ethical principle that determines what facts 
may or may not be in conformity with it, Wittgenstein focuses solely on the internal character 
subject’s will. And instead of characterizing the will as a power to influence the world, he writes, 
“The will is an attitude of the subject to the world” (NB, 87).  
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes about the ethical attitude to the world as follows: 
“To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited whole. Feeling of the 
world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.” (TLP 6.45). Interestingly, in Kant’s 
philosophy, the world as a limited whole is a notion that falls outside the bounds of cognition 
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together with the notions of purpose, freedom, and God. However, in the Third Critique Kant 
argues that there is a non-conceptual yet normative judgment that shows the world-whole as 
purposive for our moral ends so that the demand of the moral law and nature may appear to be in 
a harmony. Kant calls this type of judgment reflecting, contrasting it with determining judgments 
that subsume sensible intuitions under concepts and yield empirical cognition. Rather than 
grounded in concepts, reflecting judgments are based on a feeling that arises from a disinterested 
contemplation of the form of the object, where that contemplation is governed by the a priori 
principle of the power of judgment itself. For Kant, the paradigm example of a merely reflecting, 
non-conceptual judgment is the judgment of beauty, which does not ascribe properties to its 
object but instead claims that the form of the object has a necessary relation to one’s subjective, 
disinterested pleasure. Hence, in the Kantian tradition, a judgment based on a feeling may have 
normative force independently of the realm of conceptual thought. (CPJ 5:179–186, 5:211, 
5:236; see CPrR 5:124.) 
In accordance with Kant’s way of connecting the judgment of beauty and the world-
whole’s purposiveness for our moral goals by grounding both in the reflecting power of 
judgment, Wittgenstein connects aesthetics and ethics by reference to a sub specie aeternitatis 
attitude. In the Notebooks, he writes: “The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; 
and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and 
ethics” (NB, 83). Wittgenstein describes the perspective shared by ethics and aesthetics as one 
that sees the world or an ordinary object – not in time and space – but “together with time and 




If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is 
the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had 
studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating 
the stove it was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it. (NB, 83.) 
 
What renders the stove meaningful for the contemplating subject is the form of the perspective 
that underlies both ethics and aesthetics.16 In addition to setting aside knowledge of the stove as a 
complex fact in the world, an integral feature of the perspective is the endorsement of the 
subject’s inability to influence facts. The perspective is, as Wittgenstein writes, without fear and 
hope; i.e., fear of death and suffering as well as hope of acquiring the things for which one 
wishes. In short, the attitude characteristic of valuation takes a form of disinterested 
contemplation of an object or the world as a whole. (NB, 73–75.) The first instance, i.e., seeing 
the stove as a “my world”, as a limited whole “together with space and time”, thus fits Kant’s 
account of pure aesthetic judgments. The second instance takes the whole world, i.e. one’s life, 
as the object of similar contemplation, thereby showing it as purposive (cf. TLP 5.621; NB 73).  
It should not come as a surprise, then, that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein states that 
“ethics and aesthetics are one” (TLP 6.421). If read against the background of the evidence of the 
Notebooks, ethics and aesthetics are one in that both aesthetic and ethical “judgments” (seeing 
the stove as one’s world, seeing the world as a limited whole) spring from the same disinterested 
perspective of contemplation, capable of rendering the subject’s world meaningful or happy: 
 
Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world 
with a happy eye? 
24 
 
Life is grave, art is gay. 
For there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is the 
beautiful. 
And the beautiful is what makes happy. (NB, 86.) 
 
Especially these final remarks may give the impression of moral nihilism, where in the face of 
the lack of value in the world, one ought to just enjoy pretty things and savor the pleasurable 
experiences drawn from them. Such a reading would be misguided due to a failure to 
acknowledge the absoluteness of ethics as one of Wittgenstein’s unquestionable starting points. 
It would also fail to do justice to Wittgenstein’s claim of the transcendentality of ethics, given 
that the pleasures thus understood would be mere contingent, empirical events. But if 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on value are read against the Kantian background, as we have done, then 
the sub specie aeternitatis attitude is no less normative than a conceptually grounded thought. 
After all, the entire argument of Kant’s analytic of the beautiful is aimed at showing that, while 
the judgment of beauty is based on a subjective feeling of pleasure, it nevertheless succeeds in 
making a justified claim to necessity. This is because it relies on the a priori principle of formal 
purposiveness as the principle that allows us to see actions, objects, states of mind, and even the 
world-whole as purposive (CPJ 5:220).  
What we are suggesting, then, is that Wittgenstein’s answer to the problem of life, i.e., 
the problem of seeing one’s life as meaningful or purposive in spite of its objective lack of 
meaning or purpose, relies on a similar idea of formal purposiveness. The purposiveness in 
question is not an objective property of the facts of world that could be expressed by 
propositions, but the formal condition for the possibility of seeing sense or purpose in that world 
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and as such as ineffable as logical form grounding meaningful language. In the ethical attitude, 
the world is judged not by reference to concepts but by reference to a feeling, where the feeling 
arises from a disinterested and non-conceptual contemplation of the form of the world as a 
whole. In this respect, the subject’s ethical relation to the word resembles Kant’s account of the 
judgment of beauty that judges the purposiveness of the object by relating the representation of 
the form of the object to the subject’s feeling rather than by means of concepts to the object itself 
(CPJ 5:203).  
Recall Wittgenstein’s original question, “What do I know about God and the purpose of 
life?” (NB, 72). He responds as follows: 
 
[…] Dostoievsky is right when he says that the man who is happy is fulfilling the 
purpose of existence. 
Or again we could say that the man is fulfilling the purpose of existence who no 
longer need to have any purpose except to live. That is to say, who is content. (NB, 73; 
see TLP 6.521.) 
 
When the subject adopts the disinterested, contemplative perspective on the world, she does not 
look at the world as an aggregate of contingent facts without sense and purpose but sees the very 
same totality of facts from a perspective that shows it as a limited whole and as such as 
meaningful or purposive (NB, 74). Seeing the world as a limited whole brings the subject’s will 
into harmony with the world and thereby renders the subject’s world a “happy world” (TLP 
6.43). The happiness in question is not factual, empirical happiness, but mere harmony between 




What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear 
that there cannot be any such mark, that could be described. 
This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental 
one. (NB, 78.) 
 
So given that the requirement of empirical content for the possibility meaningful language blocks 
the route to a conceptual explanation of the grounds of that harmony, Wittgenstein turns to 
aesthetic judgment in his elucidation of the harmony between the will and the world. In doing so, 
he relies on a notion of aesthetic judgment that resembles Kant’s account of the judgment of 
beauty as a non-conceptual judgment that judges its object by feeling and yet succeeds in making 
a justified claim to necessity. Most importantly, in its appeal to the aesthetic judgment, 
Wittgenstein’s resolution of the original tension between the world of facts and the sense of the 
world, characteristic of the Tractatus’s position, echoes Kant’s strategy in his attempt to build a 
bridge between nature and freedom by reference to the judgment of beauty. 
Now, one may ask whether the solution succeeds in doing justice to Wittgenstein’s 
unquestioned starting assumption about the absoluteness of ethics, which ruled out the possibility 
of expressing ethical laws in meaningful language. That Wittgenstein himself thinks that it does 
is revealed by his remark: 
 
And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itself seems to me 
to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that 




The appeal to the notion of a tautology here is significant. While not a tautology in the technical 
sense of the Tractatus, indicating necessary truth at the expense of empirical content, the claim 
that I ought to live happily, i.e., adopt such an attitude that will establish agreement between my 
will and the world, seems to have the kind of necessity that Kant attached to his a priori 
principles. But instead of taking his lead from the conceptually grounded necessity, Wittgenstein 
places the normative pull of ethics on the form of the feeling that aesthetics and ethics, in his 
view, share. 
 
5. Levinas: The Sense of Being 
The absence of the other from Wittgenstein’s early view should not mask the structural similarity 
between Wittgenstein’s and Levinas’s views of ethics as orienting the subject towards something 
presented as a challenge. Wittgenstein’s ethical subject faces the world as “something that is 
already there” (NB, 74). For Wittgenstein, the mere existence of the world is not sufficient for 
ethics, for it is only in my relation to the world – when I see the world as an “aesthetic miracle” – 
that the possibility value arises (NB, 79, 86, see TLP 6.44). For Levinas, the subject faces 
another person. But in the ethical relation one does not approach the other person as a mere 
empirical object. While the other is also an empirical being, as the source of absolute value she 
assumes a transcendental status: “But the epiphany of the Other bears its own significance, 
independent of the signification received from the world. The Other not only comes to us from a 




Why, then, should I take the moral demand upon myself? According to Levinas, “No 
one is good voluntarily” (Levinas 1991, 11). As natural beings, we are disposed to prioritizing 
our own life over that of others: “A being is something that is attached to being, to its own being. 
That is Darwin’s idea. The being of animals is struggle for life. A struggle for life without 
ethics.” (Levinas 2003b, 172.) This is what Levinas calls the “Law of Being”, which is the 
defining mode of being for all natural entities, guided by interest. However, if the human life is 
nothing but individualistic self-affirmation driven by interest, then it is a constant state of 
struggle and war without sense. However, Levinas writes, “with the appearance of the human – 
and this my whole philosophy – there is something more important than my life, and that is the 
life of the other” (Levinas 2003b, 172).  
In Totalité et Infini, Levinas defines ethics as being put into question by the other, 
which gives rise to the moral conscience. One is called to justify one’s own freedom, which is 
limited by the other person: 
 
Moral conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to my powers 
that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in question the naive right of my 
powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality begins when freedom, 
instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent. (Levinas 1969, 
84.) 
 
Being called into question arouses a consciousness of “guilt” insofar I realize that I am not an 
innocent spontaneity, but that in my natural concern for my own being I have already taken 
space away from others. I am always already a possible usurper. (Levinas 1969, 83.) 
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For Levinas, the acknowledgement of one’s guilt means “awakening” or “sobering up” 
(Levinas 1998b, 15–32). Especially in his notes from 1950s and 1960s, Levinas calls such 
awakening an ethical attitude (see Levinas 2009, 459, 476). The awakening indicates a turning 
away from selfishness to “ethical consciousness”, to seeing my world as a world conditioned by 
the other and hence as something to be shared, to be given to others. Hence, to sober up is to 
realize that I am driven by an illusory sense of freedom and readily fall into a comforting yet 
deceptive state of “good conscience”. Levinas speaks of the vigilant I, awakened by the 
vulnerability and mortality of my neighbor, giving rise to the acknowledgment of one’s 
responsibility for the other. The ethical awakening thus takes the form of embracing a specific 
attitude towards other human beings (see e.g. Petitdemange 2003, 331).  
The unconditioned ethical obligation to give from one’s own without hope of a 
recompense should guide our everyday dealings, whether theoretical, practical, or political. 
Hence, when Levinas claims that ethics is a fundamental dimension of human life, he is not only 
making a descriptive phenomenological observation, but a normative one. Ethics as the 
transcendental condition for the possibility of sense must guide and serve as a standard. 
Acknowledgement of the endless responsibility, Levinas writes, “justifies being by that which 
assures it” (Levinas 1998b, 177). That ethics “justifies” being means that it is the standard against 
which being is measured; that ethics “assures being” means that it is the ground of being. 
Accordingly, to be ethically awakened is to acknowledge the fundamentality of the ethical and to 
treat it as a standard, which is precisely what the ethical attitude means. Levinas writes: 
 
I am not saying that the human being is a saint, I’m saying that he or she is the one who 
has understood that holiness is indisputable […] the ideal of holiness is what humanity 
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has introduced into being. An ideal of holiness contrary to the laws of being. (Levinas 
1998a, 109–114.) 
 
So for Levinas, ethics is unreasonable and “disinterested” (See Levinas 2003b, 172; 
Levinas 1991, 8). Ethics is unreasonable because it is contrary to my natural mode of being and 
because it requires everything, including self-sacrifice. It is disinterested because the subject is 
forced to set aside her personal interests, to “always empty oneself anew” (Levinas 1991, 92). 
One might think that the centrality of the other and the demand to care for the other introduces an 
interest into Levinas’s picture. However, insofar as there is an interest, it does not concern my 
own being: “The fear for another as a fear for the death of a neighbor is my fear but it is in no 
wise a fear for me” (Levinas 1998b, 176). Rather, to embrace the ethical, disinterested attitude is 
to see the world as something I must give to the other without a promise of recompense. And to 
see the world in this way is to see it as having sense.  
Both Levinas and Wittgenstein thus connect ethics with a way of seeing the world. In 
conversation with Friedrich Weismann, Wittgenstein reportedly noted that people have felt a 
connection between ethics and the existence of the world and expressed the connection as 
follows: “God the Father created the world, while God the Son (or the Word proceeding from 
God) is the ethical” (Waismann 1965, 16). Levinas addresses the connection in one of his 
Talmudic Readings, discussing a passage from the Tractate Shabbat (88a–88b) that asks, why the 
Earth trembled in fear and then become calm when the Law was given (cf. Psalm 76:9). Levinas 
locates the answer in Rash Lakish’s interpretation of Genesis 1:31. According to Rash Lakish, 
the earth was afraid because its fate was decided: in creation, God made a covenant with the 
world, namely, that as long as His Will is fulfilled, the world will exist. Hence, the calm was due 
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to the consent given by Israel to follow the Law. For Levinas, this means that the ethical (the 
Law) is the sustaining principle of the whole of creation; that is, the ethical is the condition of the 
world (Levinas 1969, 204, 212). 
For Levinas, “The world is here so that ethical order has the possibility of being 
fulfilled. The act by which the Israelites accept the Torah is the act which gives meaning to 
reality. To refuse the Torah is to bring being back to nothingness.” (Levinas 1994, 41.) This 
means that evil is nothing but a chaotic state meaninglessness devoid of value. The choice given 
by God between Law or nothingness becomes in Levinas’s work a choice between sense and 
senselessness, between ethics and mere being. To consent to the ethical demand, then, is to give 
priority to ethics over being, to acknowledge absolute value, which is irreducible to how the 
world is and which gives sense to being itself. As Levinas writes: “Being has sense. The sense of 
being, the sense of creation – is the realization of the Torah [ethics].” (ibid., 41; translation 
modified.) But it is not enough for Levinas to merely recognize the priority of the ethical. I must 
also realize my responsibility by keeping the world from falling into chaos. As God brought 
order into to primal chaos (tohu-va-bohu) through his creative action, it is my responsibility to 
continue to enact the work of creation by maintaining the ethical order. And this just is the task 
of ensuring that the world has sense.  
The ethical attitude is to see the world in the right way, as normatively oriented from the 
start, governed by an ethical order whose fulfillment guarantees the world sense. In this respect, 
Levinas comes close to Wittgenstein, for whom ethics sees the world sub specie aeterni, as a 
limited whole and as such meaningful. However, by contrast to Wittgenstein, whose description 
of the view from eternity has an aesthetic, contemplative character, for Levinas, the perspective 
of eternity is the perspective of the ethical obligation to and for the other. Importantly, neither 
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Wittgenstein nor Levinas refer to eternity as a transcendent realm. Levinas commends Kant on 
the idea that orientation in thinking is to direct oneself towards that which exceeds the limits of 
knowledge, towards a beyond which cannot be said to be. However, as ethics requires 
renouncing any recompense, Levinas rejects Kant’s conception of the highest good as saying too 
much. He asks, “Are we entering a moment in history in which the good must be loved without 
promises […] a time when the only right to reward would be not to expect one” (Levinas 1999, 
109). In this respect Levinas, like Wittgenstein, takes ethics to contain its own reward and 




We have argued that both Wittgenstein and Levinas ought to be read as endorsing the divide 
between the domains of nature and freedom, which lies at the core of Kant’s practical 
philosophy. For both, the relevant contrast lies between the world of facts and the sense of that 
world. Moreover, both respond to the philosophical challenge arising from the divide by 
appealing, in part, to resources provided by Kant’s philosophy. The most important affinity 
between Wittgenstein and Levinas is that, in spite of granting a need for a transcendental 
foundation for ethics, they reject the possibility of a conceptual or rational explication of that 
foundation. Any foundation for ethics – whether given by reference to facts or to a conceptually 
expressible principle – will only make ethics conditional. Instead, for both, ethics is a condition 
of the world. The absolute ethical obligation, which the subject finds in herself independently of 
the facts of the world, is the necessary condition for the possibility of the world’s sense.  
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Moreover, Wittgenstein and Levinas come together in denying the availability of a 
reward for the ethical orientation – or rather, as both claim, that the reward resides in the ethical 
relation itself. This is to say that both Wittgenstein and Levinas take Kant’s initial confirmation 
of a break between morality and its reward reflecting the gulf between nature and morality to its 
extreme. Accordingly, the hope of a just distribution of happiness according to moral worth that 
Kant presents as grounded in practical reason, becomes extremely thin: for the subject, the 
ethical demand holds no other promise but her ability to transcend the contingency of the world 
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1 For Kant, the moral law is the principle of universalizability of one’s maxim: insofar as 
something is a reason for me, it ought to be a reason for everyone else as well, for otherwise it 
would not make sense to talk about reasons in the first place. Accordingly, the universalizability 
principle is a principle constitutive of agency understood as responsiveness to reasons. (G 4:421, 
see Allison 1990, 204–205.) 
2 Our goal is not to defend a historical claim of actual influence, but to indicate those substantial 
affinities between Wittgenstein and Levinas that we see as fruitfully illuminated against the 
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background of Kant’s philosophy. Our argument relies on the Kantian interpretation of the 
philosophical goals of the Tractatus defended and developed by, e.g., Stenius 1960, Kannisto 
1986, Glock 1992 and 1997, Moore 2013, and Appelqvist 2013, 2016, and 2018. The most 
accessible account of the philosophical connections between Levinas and Kant is Chalier 2002; 
see also Cohen 2010; Basterra 2015; Frangeskou 2017.  
3 Our argument relies on the material of Notebooks 1914–1916 and Wittgenstein’s 1929 “Lecture 
on Ethics”. While we acknowledge the limitations of this approach, in our view the Tractatus’s 
scarce remarks on value can be understood only if read against the background of Wittgenstein’s 
more substantial discussions on the theme. 
4 On the Kantianism of Wittgenstein’s early view of the world of knowledge and ethics, see 
Moore 1987. For comparisons between Levinas and Wittgenstein from the viewpoint of the 
resolute reading of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, see, e.g., Øvergaard 2007, Morgan 2007.  
5 Here, we rely on Kannisto’s interpretation according to which even false propositions have 
been projected onto a specific place in reality (see TLP 3.12; Kannisto 1986, 66–68). 
6 On the transcendentality of logic in the Tractatus, see Kannisto 1986, Glock 1992, and 
Appelqvist 2016. 
7 The identification of the world and life is unsurprising if the Tractatus is read as a work 
committed to transcendental idealism. In that framework, the formal unity of the world and 
thought is grounded in the metaphysical subject as the vehicle of the form shared by thought and 
reality. Such a view may be seen as underlying Wittgenstein’s remark: “The world is my world: 
this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) 
mean the limits of my world” (TLP 5.62). 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Wittgenstein’s reference to the world’s purpose resonates with Kant’s terminology in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment. There, Kant introduces the distinction between the 
determining (cognitive) and the reflecting (aesthetic) perspectives on the world: the first sees the 
world as an aggregate of facts, the latter sees objects, actions, states of mind, and the world as a 
purposive (CPJ 5:179–181, 20:217–218). While the latter perspective does not amount to 
knowledge, Kant takes it to strengthen one’s hope in highest good, namely, in God’s existence 
and the purposiveness of the world for our moral efforts. 
9 In terms of their relative and absolute normative forces, Wittgenstein’s contrast between 
relative and absolute value judgments corresponds to Kant’s contrast between hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives (see G 4:414). 
10 This phrasing is distinctly Schopenhauerian, raising the contrast between Will and Idea (see 
Hacker 1986, 87–90). At the same time, Wittgenstein’s position differs from the 
Schopenhauerian view in that, while for Schopenhauer all willing is problematic, Wittgenstein 
endorses the Kantian distinction between good and bad willing. Most importantly, as noted by 
Glock, Schopenhauer’s influence does not help in explaining Wittgenstein’s characteristically 
Kantian concern with the necessary, formal conditions of experiencing or depicting reality (see 
Glock 1999, 425–432). 
11 Accordingly, Wittgenstein evocation of happiness as a manifestation of good will does not 
directly conflict with Kant’s rejection of happiness as the guiding principle of morality (G 
4:417–419; 442). Given the contemplative quality of the subject’s attitude to the world, 
happiness as “agreement” or “harmony” is more akin to the disinterested pleasure Kant identifies 
as the experience characteristic of a judgment of beauty (CPJ 5:211). 
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12 In Levinas’s terminology, the “Said” is the register of intentional thought. Narrowly, the Said 
is any proposition that says something about the world and inner worldly objects. More broadly, 
the Said is the register of all that can be asserted and thought insofar as this is taken to include 
the meaning-constitutive intentional relation between the subject and the world. By contrast, the 
“Saying” is the immediate openness toward the other. It is not yet linguistic and it is irreducible 
to the Said. The Saying does not point to a transcendent domain outside the phenomenal world, 
but to my concrete relation with another. According to Levinas, the Western philosophical 
enterprise has been exclusively interested in the Said without willingness or ability to “think” the 
Saying (the unsayable, the ineffable). Levinas’s own project is to uncover the Saying, covered up 
by the Said (this is called “reduction”). Yet, pure Saying, as unsayable, cannot be said, thus 
making the attempted reduction a never-ending task. When the Saying is described, it is 
introduced in to the register of the Said. Thus, the philosopher’s task is to continuously “unsay” 
that which is said about the Saying. (See Levinas 1991, 43–45, 181; Morgan 2007, 300–323; 
Franck 2008, 213–220.) 
13 Following Morgan 2007, we read Levinas as committed to transcendentalism in the sense in 
which transcendentality refers to the necessary conditions for the possibility of different types of 
judgments. Alluding to Kant’s philosophy in his 1935 essay on the philosophical strength of 
Maimonides’s thought, Levinas writes: “For the first time, and with luminous lucidity, 
Maimonides separated the laws of a thinking that takes the world as an object from principles of 
thought relating to the conditions of the world. For the first time he put a stop to the impulse of 
reason to apply notions borrowed from the world to that which is beyond the world. For the first 
time he glimpsed what one calls, six centuries later, the critique of pure reason.” (Levinas 2008, 
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94). For criticisms of the transcendental reading of Levinas, see Bernasconi 2005; Shaw 2008, 
133–176. 
14 For transcendental readings of Levinas, see de Boer 1997, 1–32; Morgan 2007; and Salanskis 
2015, 9–43. 
15 While we are not suggesting that Levinas’s notions of fact, sayability, and ineffability are 
identical with those of Wittgenstein, the parallels are striking. 
16 For a more detailed argument to this effect, see Appelqvist 2013.  
17 Parts of the Wittgenstein sections of this paper were presented at the Åbo Academi Philosophy 
Seminar on March 5 2018 and at the Stirling Early Analytic Group on April 23 2019. Appelqvist 
would like to thank the participants of these events, especially Lars Hertzberg, Martin 
Gustafsson, Colin Johnston, Michael Potter, and Peter Sullivan, for their comments and critical 
remarks. We would also like to thank Jean-Michel Salanskis, Georges Hansel, and Michael 
Roubach for their valuable feedback on an earlier version of this paper. 
